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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 920472-CA

MARK DAVID LEWIS,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a conviction for the offense of "Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol," Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44, Utah Code
Annotated (1953 as amended), a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Fourth
Circuit Court of the State of Utah, the Honorable Lynn W. Davis,
presiding.

CLEVE J. HATCH
Public Defenders
60 East, 100 South
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorney for Appellant
BENJAMIN T. DAVIS
County Attorney's Office
100 E. Center St., #2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Attorney for Appellee
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 920472-CA

vs.
MARK DAVID LEWIS,
Defendant/Appellant,

Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as
amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Whether comments made by the trial court instructing the

prosecution as to how it should proceed and as to the credibility
and weight to be given the testimony of a prosection witness
deprives the defendant of a fair trial and thus constitutes
reversible error.
II.

Whether the failure of the prosecution to identify the

defendant in its case in chief constitutes reversible error.
III. Whether the trial court should have recused itself for
prejudice upon motion by the defense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE.
This is an appeal of a criminal case for Driving Under the
Influence of Alcohol (DUI).

The case comes before the Utah Court

of Appeals after defendant Mark David Lewis was convicted at trial

and judgement was entered thereon.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.
On 21 October, 1991, Mark David Lewis, in a rural area
unfamiliar

to him, drove his vehicle

onto what he believed

(according to signage and poor lighting), was a freeway on-ramp.
Mr. Lewis' vehicle went off-road and became immobile on railroad
tracks. (T. at 10.) During his efforts to free his vehicle, police
personnel arrived at the scene to investigate. (T. at 9.)

After

Mr. Lewis informed the police that he nearly had the vehicle free,
the officers remained at the scene to ensure no assistance was
necessary. (T. at 13.)

Subsequently, upon noting that a passenger

in the vehicle was intoxicated, (T. at 11,) the officer began to
administer a field sobriety test (FST) to Mr. Lewis. (T. at 15-22.)Although the facts as to how well Mr. Lewis performed on the FST
are controverted, the officer arrested Mr. Lewis for DUI. (T. at
22.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
At trial, the court committed a significant error by first
instructing the prosecutor as to how to argue his case, and
immediately thereafter informing the prosecutor that the testimony
of a particular witness for the prosecution should have been given
more weight and credibility than the prosecutor had acknowledged.
(T. at 57 et. seq.)
Later in the trial, after the prosecution had rested and the
defense was beginning its case in chief, the defense moved for
dismissal on the ground that the prosecution had failed to produce
2

evidence identifying Mr. Lewis as the defendant. (T. at 76.)
Rather than grant the motion, the court forestalled the defense by
allowing the prosecution to re-open its case in chief to recall a
witness in order to identify Mr. Lewis as the defendant. (T. at 9697.) As to the motive for the court's ruling, the defense believes
it results from prejudice on the part of the trial court as against
Mr. Lewis.

Such prejudice is reflected in the comments of the

court directed at the prosecution which are mentioned above.

A

motion was made that the court recuse itself for such prejudice,
but again the motion for the defense was denied. (T. at 64-65.)
ARGUMENT I,
IMPROPER JUDICIAL COMMENT.
In Meier v. Christensen, 389 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah, 1964), the
Utah Supreme Court said "trial courts should be careful not to
comment or express opinions on the evidence." In another case from
the Utah Supreme Court, Fox v. Taylor, 350 P. 2d 154, 157 (Utah,
1960) , the state high Court said "[w]e recognize the duty of the
court under our law to avoid comments on the evidence; or which may
tend to indicate an opinion as to what the facts are on disputed
issues."

(See also; Ortega v. Thomasr 383 P.2d 406 (Utah, 1963);

Federated Milk Producers' Assoc, Inc. v. Statewide Plumbing &
Heating Co. , 358 P.2d

348 (Utah, 1961), both recognizing the

impropriety of comments as to evidence by trial court judge.)
During the trial of the case here on appeal, the trial judge,
in response to the prosecutor's

remarks and what the court

apparently thought was a lack of necessary
3

fervor, told the

prosecutor to "be an advocate," and went on to express the court's
opinion as to the experience of a police officer witness and the
resulting weight that should thus attach to his testimony.

The

court said
why can't an officer, based upon his seventeen years of
experience, make a determination whether somebody passed
or failed [a field sobriety test]? He can state in his
opinion whether or not he passed or failed, based upon
seventeen years of experience and hundreds of cases.
Don't defeat his own ability to make those judgements and
have that opinion. (T. at 57-58.)
This is obviously an attempt by the court to instruct the
prosecution as to its procedure and handling of its case.

Such

instruction is not only unwarranted, but more importantly works
against the adversarial system wherein the court is to remain
absolutely neutral as to the parties.
As such, the comments of the court as to how the prosecutor should
proceed and the quality of the witness's testimony are sufficient
for reversal of the trial court's judgement upon the conviction.
ARGUMENT II,
FAILURE OF PROSECUTION TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT.
Nowhere in the prosecution's case in chief did it produce
evidence showing that Mark David Lewis was in fact the individual
at the scene of incident of October 21. That is, the only point at
which the prosecution introduced such identification testimony was
after a Dismissal Motion made by defense counsel for failing to
identify the defendant, which motion was made after the prosecution
had rested.

(Transcript at 76.)

It was at that point in the

proceeding when the court allowed the prosecution to re-open its
4

case and recall a wi tness to i dentify Mark David Lewis as the
individual ^
1

the scene of the arrest.

(Transcript ^^ 96, 9 7 ,

)
In Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P. 2d 1 336 (Utah, 1 9 8 6 ) , the U tali

Supreme Court stated, "i n a criminal prosecution every element of
the offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. 11 I Citing
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § ; 6 :i -50J (J ) ) Iemphasis a d d e d ) .
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ARGUMENT III.
JUDICIAL PREJUDICE, FAILURE TO RECUSE.
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itself for prejudice. (T. at 64-65, e t . seq.)
In State v. Gardner, 78 9 P,;d ; m , " \B illtah, 1939), the Utah
Supreme Co
argues that

'

"

' fendan). dues nut .ulleqe any dctual bias but
judge should recuse himself where there L an

appearance of bias.

We agree."

The Court went on to say

[i]f the allegations in the affidavit are true and they
would give a reasonable person cause to doubt whether the
judge could be impartial under the circumstances, he
should recuse himself. Nothing is more damaging to the
public confidence in the legal system than the appearance
of bias or prejudice on the part of the judge." (Id.)
As to whether a case should be reversed for error due to
judicial prejudice, the test is "whether *there was a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant./fl

(Id.,

citing State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah, 1982)).
This Court should recognize that absent such prejudice on the
part of the trial court, such prejudice evidenced by comments made
at trial favoring the prosecution and its witnesses, it is likely
it would not have allowed the state to re-open its case after
resting and subsequent to the opening of the defense in order to
introduce evidence regarding the identity of the defendant, a fact
obviously necessary for conviction. Had the Court not allowed the
prosecution such wide latitude, it likely would have had to dismiss
the case upon motion made by the defense. (Trial record at 76.) It
is clear that there is a reasonable

likelihood

that a more

favorable result for Mr. Lewis would have occurred were it not for
the prejudice displayed by the trial court.
In State v. Neeleyr 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah, 1988), the Utah
Supreme Court referred to Utah Code Annotated 77-35-29 and the Utah
Code of Judicial Conduct 3(c)(1)(b) (1981) when it said
it has been suggested that a trial judge disqualify
himself whenever an affidavit of bias and prejudice is
filed against him in good faith . . . (citing State v.
Byinaton. 200 P.2d 723 (Utah, 1948)). There the Court
went on to say ". . . a judge should recuse himself when
6

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . .
this standard set forth by the Code of Judicial Conduct
should be given careful consideration by the trial judge.
It may require recusal in instances where no actual bias
is shown. Failure to observe it may subject the judge to
disciplinary measures . . . "
. . . [W]e recommend the practice that a judge recuse himself
where there is a colorable claim of bias or prejudice . . ."
Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094.
Although in this case prejudice by the court was clear,
Byington and Neeley clarify the attitude of the Utah Supreme Court
on the mere appearance
recognized

of prejudice.

Had

the trial court

its prejudice against Mr. Lewis and appropriately

recused itself, it is probable that Mr. Lewis would have had his
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Identify granted.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in making improper comments as to how
the prosecution should conduct its case and as to the weight to be
given to the statements of its witness. Such err was recognized by
the defense.

The court further erred in failing to recuse itself

for prejudice when so moved by the defense.

The result of that

prejudice was the court's allowance of the prosecution to re-open
its case to identify Mr. Lewis after the defense had commenced its
case in chief.

Such error resulted in a failure of the judicial

system to deal fairly with Mr. Lewis at his trial.

Accordingly,

defense counsel respectfully requests that this court reverse the
judgement of the trial court and dismiss the case with prejudice.
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Respectfully submitted this

day of February, 1993.
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Telephone: (801) 374-1212
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
ADDENDUM TO BREIF
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 920472-CA
MARK DAVID LEWIS,
Defendant.
Comes now the Defendant, Mark David Lewis, by and through his
attorney of record, Cleve J. Hatch, and does hereby susbmit the
following Addendum to Brief.
Dated this

/>2 day of February, 1993.

Cleve J^Hatchf

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Addendum to Brief, postage prepaid, to Ben Davis, 100 East
Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah

84606, and to Utah Court of Appeals,

230 South 500 East, Suite 400 Salt Lake City, Utah
day of February, 1993.
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LEWIS, MARK DAVID

CASE NO: 925001121

PAGE 2

DOCKET INFORMATION:
Chrg: DUI
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju
Fine Amount:
1000.00
Suspended:
400.00
Jail:
180 DAYS
Suspended: 178 DAYS
LWD/THE JURY HAVING FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY AND DEFENDANT HAVING
WAIVED SENTENCING DEFENDANT IS FINED $1000/$600 SUSP TO BE TAKEN
FROM BAIL POSTED. DEFENDNAT IS TO SERVE 2 DAYS (LESS 5 HRS
CREDITED FOR TIME ALREADY SERVED) TO BE SERVED IN THE UTAH CO.
JAIL ON WEEKENDS OR DAYS OFF BY 8/23/92. DEFENDANT IS ORDERED
TO HAVE AN ALCOHOL EVALUATION (IF DONE IN UTAH COUNTY IT MAY BE
PAID FOR FROM THE TRUST FUND. DEFENSE COUNSEL MOVED TO STAY
EXECUTION ON FINE/JAIL. HE IS ORDERED TO FILE SUCH MOTIONS
WITH THE COURT ALONG WITH APPROPRIATE AFFIDAVITS. CC: UTAH
COUNTY JAIL AND UTAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE.

BY THE COURT

resulted
;s or in a
idence to
a lesser
>r offense
included
B, or va-

PART 5
BURDEN OF PROOF

76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Els
ment of the offense" defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is pra
sumed to be innocent until each element of the OB
fense charged against him is proved beyond a reasoffl
L resulted able doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendara
srsed, set shall be acquitted.
not been
(2) As used in this part the words "element of th«
apable of offense" mean:
cepted by
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, ofl
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or fori
prosecubidden in the definition of the offense;
e verdict,
(b) The culpable mental state required.
ttal, and
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are npj
3lled and elements of the offense but shall be established by a
y trial is preponderance of the evidence.
1973
r

ever, terf:
mination;

76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation ofl
proof — When not required.
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a de> object to fense:
(1) By allegation in an information, indict!
he record
ment, or other charge; or
ause:
(2) By proof, unless:
o proceed
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a
le law; or
result of evidence presented at trial, either
3 proceedby the prosecution or the defense; or
lat would
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense;
a verdict
and the defendant has presented evidence 0:
such affirmative defense.
197;

»ut of the
the state
a the trial
nt or the

76-1-503. Presumption of fact.
An evidentiary presumption established by this
code or other penal statute has the following conse«
quences:

A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office
Impartially and Diligently.
"he judicial duties of a full-time judge take precedence over all other activii. These judicial duties include all the duties of the office prescribed by law.
the performance of these duties, the following standards apply:
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence in it. A judge should be unswayed by partisan interests,
public clamor, or fear of criticism.
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings
before the court.
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants,
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others who come before the court or
the judge in the judge's official capacity, and should require similar
conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to
judicial direction and control.
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law,
and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex
parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending
proceeding. A judge may communicate with court staff and/or other
judges about issues in a case without engaging in inappropriate ex
parte communication provided that the judge does not abrogate the
responsibility to personally decide the case pending before the court.
A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on
the law applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives
notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the
advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond.
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court.
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending
or impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making
public statements in the course of their official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court.
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, or recording
in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may
authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other,
purposes of judicial administration; or
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of
investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings.
(8) A judge should prohibit taking photographs (including motion
picture and videotape) in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions,
except that still photographs of the judge and other court personnel,

urt shall specifically forbid the taking of any photographs where it
ids a substantial likelihood that such activity would jeopardize a
ir hearing or trial in the matter at issue.
Administrative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibiles, maintain professional competence in judicial administration,
id facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities
other judges and court officials.
(2) A judge should require staff and court officials subject to judiil direction and control to observe the relevant ethical standards of
lelity and diligence.
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary meares against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which
e judge may become aware. However, this provision shall not apply
information which is generated and communicated under the poli»s of the Judicial Performance Evaluation Program.
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments and should
ercise the power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoidg nepotism and favoritism. A judge should not approve compensam of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered.
Disqualification.
(1) Disqualification must be entered in a proceeding by any judge
tiose impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but
>t limited to instances where:
(a) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a
party, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceeding;
(b) The judge had served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, had practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the
matter at the time of their association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it;
(c) The judge knows of a financial interest, including fiduciary
interest, of either the judge personally or the judge's spouse
and/or minor children residing in the household, in the subject
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding;
(d) The judge or spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or
trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material
witness in the proceeding.
(2) A judge should be informed about personal and fiduciary finanal interests, and make a reasonable effort to be informed about the
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OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS:
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